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Abstract
In this paper the authors model the demand for train kilometres with a disaggregate
structural demand model, thereby recognising the fact that consumers have to make a
simultaneous choice for this demand and for the type of ticket with which they want to
travel. The model is in line with microeconomic theory, which implies that the choice of
ticket type is closely linked to the indirect utlility function. Special attention has been paid
to the possibility that individuals do not buy the ticket that would have been most
advantageous, given their actual demand for train kilometres. A result implies that the
average traveller behaves as if the price of a reduction card were more expensive than it
actually is, which not only has considerable implications for the railway company whose
aim is to maximise its revenues, but also for the government whose aim is to stimulate the
use of public transport.
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Introduction
Most railway companies oVer various types of train tickets. Apart from
full tariV tickets, travellers are often able to opt for various kinds of tickets
that involve a ®xed fee in order to ‘‘participate’’ and a marginal price that
is lower than the ‘‘full tariV’’ marginal price. This results in a declining
price schedule: travellers with high demand for train kilometres face a
lower marginal (and average) price than travellers with low demand. The
theoretical justi®cations for such a diVerentiated price structure have by
now become common knowledge among public economists in general and
transport economists in particular; see Brown and Sibley (1986) and
Carbajo (1988), respectively, for an overview.
This paper aims at developing and estimating a disaggregate model for
the demand for train kilometres. This (individual) demand typically
depends on price and hence on the choice of train ticket, which implies
that the choice of ticket type is a typical explanatory variable for the
demand for train kilometres. However, this choice of ticket type is a
typical endogenous variable, as in turn this variable will depend on the
demand for train kilometres. When setting up a demand model it is
therefore important to recognise the close relation of the level of the
demand for train kilometres on the one hand and the choice of ticket type
on the other. Simply using the choice of ticket type as an explanatory
variable for the demand for train kilometres is inconsistent as this latter
variable will also aVect the choice of ticket type. Conversely, it makes no
sense to explain separately the observed choice of ticket type from the
observed demand for train kilometres. Using more technical terms, such
analyses lead to biased estimates due to neglecting the endogeneity of an
explanatory variable. It is therefore important to specify a simultaneous
model that both explains the demand for train kilometres from the choice
of ticket type, in particular from the price of this ticket type, and also
explains the choice of ticket type from the demand for train kilometres.
Making use of a maximum likelihood procedure this simultaneous model
can be consistently estimated. Regarding the model structure, there are
many possibilities for such a simultaneous model, but from the point of
view of an economist the microeconomic framework is most appealing due
to its strong theoretical justi®cations. This implies that the choice of ticket
type is closely linked to the indirect utility function, which can be retrieved
from the demand function for train kilometres by making use of Roy’s
identity.
This approach dates back to Burtless and Hausman (1978)’s seminal
paper on the supply of labour by individuals. Since then many empirical
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studies that involve nonlinear budget constraints have been carried out.
Among others, one can ®nd applications in the ®elds of electricity demand
(Dubin and McFadden, 1984; Herriges and King, 1994), and the demand
for housing (King, 1980; Hausman and Wise, 1980; Hoyt and Rosenthal,
1990). An important distinction between the current work and most of
these studies concerns the nature of the discrete choice. In most applica-
tions, such as labour supply, the discrete choice is automatically tied to the
continuous choice and therefore has an implicit nature. For example, a
person who chooses to work H hours a week will automatically face the
tax rate that goes with this amount H. In other applications however, such
as the demand for telecommunication and travel demand, the discrete
choice has an explicit nature. As the choice of the ticket type is optional, it
is likely that people may in some cases make choices that are a priori
unexpected. This can be due to optimisation error of the individual, which
may for example be caused by inadequate information. On the other hand
it should be realised that the choice of ticket type has to be made in
advance Ð usually on a yearly basis Ð which may be the cause of risk-
averse behaviour of the individual. This hypothesis is con®rmed by the
data, which suggest that people are conservative with regard to the pur-
chase of a reduction card. This risk aversion, together with the existence of
non-monetary application costs such as waiting time and eVort to submit
an application form, is su cient reason to incorporate a threshold para-
meter into the model that measures to what extent people are reluctant to
buy a reduced fare card.
In the context of transport modelling, the present analysis has links
with the approach of Abdelwahib and Sargious (1992), who model the
demand for freight transport with a joint model for mode choice and
shipment size. Studies by de Jong (1990) and Hensher, Milthorpe and
Smith (1990), making use of discrete/continuous models for car ownership
and car use, are also linked to the approach in this paper. It is remarkable,
however, that in general there has been scarce attention to a discrete/
continuous analysis of the demand for transport. Most studies up to
present have either made use of discrete choice models, neglecting the
continuous choice, or aggregate demand models, often neglecting the
endogeneity of certain explanatory variables, such as the price variable.
The current study improves on earlier approaches as it provides a theo-
retically justi®ed framework for the travel behaviour of individuals and it
recognises the simultaneous nature of train kilometres and train tickets in
a consistent way. More concretely, this study provides estimates of price
elasticities for train kilometres during oV-peak hours and monetarises the
travellers’ reluctance to buy reduced fare cards through the inclusion of a
‘‘take-up cost’’ parameter. This study limits itself to the demand for Sec-
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ond Class tickets during oV-peak hours, but the model can be readily
generalised for the demand during peak hours or even the demand for
other transport modes.
In Section 2 the theoretical demand model for the combined demand
for train kilometres and train tickets is set out. The data are described in
Section 3. In this section special attention is paid to the observed combi-
nations of train tickets and train kilometres. Indeed, the data suggest that
in general consumers are reluctant to buy a reduction card. The transition
from the theoretical economic model in Section 2 to an estimable econo-
metric model is discussed in Section 4. In particular three issues are of
interest in this step: (i) proper speci®cation of the travellers’ reluctance to
buy reduced fare cards; (ii) allowance for individually diVerentiated tastes;
and (iii) the stochastic speci®cation of the model. Section 5 reports the
estimates, and in particular compares the elasticity estimates to earlier
estimates and discusses the implications of a positive take-up cost. Section
6 concludes and suggests several extensions of the approach in this paper.
The Demand for Train Tickets and Train Kilometres:
Microeconomic Theory
Following elementary microeconomic theory, the demand of an individual
for a certain economic good is a function of the price of that good and of
the individual’s income. A possible speci®cation of such a demand func-
tion for the case of train kilometres is the double-log speci®cation:
ln k ˆ a ln y ‡ b ln p ‡ d: …1†
In this equation the number of train kilometres travelled by an individual
is denoted by k, income is denoted by y, the price of a train kilometre is
denoted by p, and d is simply a constant. This demand equation ®xes a
two-good microeconomic framework, consisting of (a) train kilometres
and (b) a composite commodity that represents consumption on all other
goods. To stay in line with demand theory, and in particular with the
homogeneity property of the demand function in income and price, one
has to de¯ate both income and (kilometre) price by the price of this
composite commodity. As usual in cross-section analyses it is assumed
that the price of the composite commodity is equal to the ‘‘price’’ of
income, implying a numeraire that equals 1. It is seen that in this speci-
®cation both the income elasticity of demand and the price elasticity of
demand are constant at Ey ˆ a and Ep ˆ b respectively, which explains why
this model is often labelled the constant elasticity model. The use of the
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logarithmic transformation on the left-hand side has been strongly sug-
gested by a preliminary analysis of our data, which showed that the fre-
quency distribution of the demand for train kilometres is far better
described by a lognormal distribution rather than a normal distribution.
The use of logarithms on the right-hand side has the advantage that no
direct restrictions are placed on the elasticity estimates, as is the case in
many models, for example the CES and Cobb-Douglas utility speci®cation
and the linear expenditure system.1
Consider now the case that consumers can choose between diVerent
types of tickets, for example a full tariV ticket and a reduced tariV ticket
where the consumers ®rst have to buy a reduction card at ®xed cost. This
implies that consumers are able to choose their own marginal price of a
train ticket. As is well known, straightforward least squares estimation of
the model in (1) would yield biased estimates, because the demand for
kilometres has a causal in¯uence on the kilometre price.2 Therefore, it is
necessary to add an equation to the model that adequately describes the
causality of kilometres on kilometre price. There are several ways to do
this, but from an economic point of view it is certainly most appealing to
let this additional equation be consistent with microeconomic theory. The
proper way of doing so starts by deriving the indirect utility function from
the demand equation in (1). This can be achieved by rewriting Roy’s
identity as a diVerential equation and making use of the implicit function
theorem. Following Burtless and Hausman (1978), this procedure yields
the following indirect utility function:






Hence it is possible to determine the conditional demand function and the
conditional indirect utility function for each type of train ticket. Suppose
1See Hausman (1980) for a discussion. As an illustration, consider the semi-log
speci®cation ln k ˆ y0 ‡ y1y ‡ y2p. The implied price elasticity of this model equals y2p,
and hence it is seen that the higher the price one pays, the higher will be (the absolute
value of) its implied price elasticity. This is particularly unlikely for the demand for train
kilometres, because it is not expected that travellers with relatively low use are the ones
with the highest price sensitivity. A relatively price sensitive traveller, however, would be
tempted to explore the bene®ts of reduction cards, seasonal tickets, and so on. Resuming
matters in a more general fashion, the constant elasticity model of (1) does not impose a
similar restriction on the price elasticity, and has therefore been chosen to be the most
suitable speci®cation for this study.
2See Train (1986) for an intuitively appealing illustration of such endogeneity bias.
Mannering (1986) shows, through an empirical comparison of (biased) least squares
estimates with unbiased counterparts, that the inconsistent estimation of transportdemand
models indeed causes a substantial bias in estimates for price and income elasticities.
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that one is able to choose between two ticket types:3 First, one may simply
travel with the standard full fare tickets and pay a marginal price of, say,
pf. The second possibility is to buy a reduced fare card at a ®xed price of,
say, pr, and hence pay a marginal price that equals a fraction h of the full
tariV price ( 0 µ h < 1). This gives a budget constraint similar to the one in
Figure 1, where the budget frontier ABC is obtained as an optimal com-
bination of the full tariV budget frontier ABE and the reduced tariV
budget frontier DBC. Note that the length of AD is exactly the price of a
reduction card pr. To a utility maximising individual the consumption of a
package on the curve DBE should be no option, as this is not in accor-
dance with the conventional wisdom that utility is nondecreasing in
income. (In later sections we will come back to this.) Consider now the
case that the individual’s optimal demand for train kilometres, given that
he travels with full tariV tickets, locates on AB, and that his optimal
demand for train kilometres, given that he travels at reduced tariV, locates
at the segment BC. In the ®gure these conditional demand functions have
been denoted by x¤1 and x
¤
2 respectively. The accompanying conditional
indirect utilities v1 and v2 determine the depicted indiVerence curves
‘‘u ˆ v1’’ and ‘‘u ˆ v2’’. It can now be seen that if:
(i) the conditional indirect utility of travelling at reduced tariV exceeds
the conditional indirect utility of travelling at full tariV: v2 > v1; and
(ii) utility is quasi-concave;
then the individual will prefer to buy a reduction card and simultaneously
consume x¤2 kilometres at reduced tariV. The quasi-concavity condition
guarantees that the indiVerence curves do not cross, so that demand at x¤2
is indeed optimal. Figure 2 depicts the case where the individual prefers to
travel at full tariV, so the inequality in (i) reverses.4 The case that the
conditional demand for a reduced tariV card locates at DB can be ruled
out, as the indirect utility that is inherent in such demand will always be
inferior to the conditional demand for full tariV tickets that locates on AB
Ð provided that the quasi-concavity condition holds.5
3The following can straightforwardly be generalised to the case where more ticket types are
involved. See Pudney (1989) for more details.
4Note that it is theoretically possible that one is indiVerent between the two ticket types. In
this case the relevant indiVerence curves coincide and go through both conditional
demands x¤1 and x
¤
2 . In the empirical context this is usually neglected, as with the
introduction of stochastic error terms into the model, the probability of being indiVerent
between the two ticket types equals zero and is therefore no longer relevant.
5As mentioned above, no consumer should be inclined to have demand on DBE. Hence, if
x¤2 locates on DB, this implies that x
¤
1 must be at AB.
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Returning to the model, the condition in (i) for preferring to travel at
reduced tariV instead of full tariV rewrites as
v…hpf; Y ¡ pr† > v…pf; Y†; …3†
Figure 1
Two ticket types: Preference of a reduction card …v2 > v1†
Figure 2
Two ticket types: Preference of full tariV tickets …v1 > v2†
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where total income is now denoted by Y. Having made the decision on
which type of travel card one wants, the net income y equals Y ¡ pr for
reduced tariV travellers and Y for full tariV travellers, respectively.
Working out this equation with the expression for the indirect utility
function in (2), we arrive at the following inequality, which will prove
convenient as we will extend our model in the fourth section:
pr < gY; …4†
where
g :ˆ 1 ¡ 1 ¡





It is seen that g can be interpreted as the (maximum) fraction of income
that is available for the purchase of a reduction card. Given his income Y,
a traveller values the reduction card at gY, and hence decides to purchase a
reduction card if, and only if, this valuation is higher than the actual price
pr, so that the purchase of this reduction card yields an implicit monetary
bene®t of gY ¡ pr. Note that g is large for travellers who are relatively
sensitive to price changes, while it is low for travellers who are relatively
sensitive to income changes. Equations (4) and (5) therefore show that
travellers who are relatively more sensitive to price changes than they are
to income changes are more inclined to buy a reduced fare card than
others.
Finally the quasi-concavity condition in (ii) writes as6




where y equals Y ¡ pr or Y respectively, dependent on whether one owns a
reduction card or not, and p equals hpf and pf for the same respective
cases. In less technical terms this inequality states that the compensated
own-price-eVect of train kilometres should be negative, a well known
result in microeconomic theory.
Data
In this paper we make use of a data set from the Netherlands Railways
(NS), the so-called ‘‘Basisonderzoek’’ (BO). This data set was obtained
6See Burtless and Hausman (1978) for details. Note that in the present two-good case,
satisfaction of this inequality automatically dissolves the integrability problem, which
demands symmetry and negative semide®niteness of the Slutsky matrix.
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through a survey during the period April 1992 to March 1993. The most
important objective of the study was to analyse the pro®les of travellers, in
particular those of travellers by train. The survey consisted of two parts.
First, a random sample from the population of Dutch households was
drawn, after which one individual from the household was asked about
personal characteristics such as age, gender and education. The subjects
were also asked about their possession of train fare reduction tickets, car
possession, and other factors of interest for the Netherlands Railways.
Second, every subject was asked to keep a month’s diary of his travel
behaviour as far as railway transport was concerned. The subjects in the
second data set are a subsample of those in the ®rst, satisfying two
selection criteria: (i) the subject indicated that he travelled by train during
the past year; and (ii) the subject was willing to keep a travel diary. For the
purpose of this paper we have linked both data sets in order to be able to
include individual characteristics into the demand equation that was
speci®ed in (1).
Table 1 reports the frequencies of ‘‘e cient’’ and ‘‘ine cient’’ tra-
vellers, where an ‘‘e cient traveller’’ is de®ned as an individual who buys
the right type of train ticket, given his demand for train kilometres.
Formally, a traveller who owns a reduction ticket and has reported tra-
velling k kilometres is called e cient if
cf …k† ¶ cr…k†; …6†
where cf …¢† is the full tariV cost function and cr…¢† is the reduced tariV cost
function.7 A similar de®nition can be given for ‘‘full tariV e ciency’’.
Table 1 shows that nearly half the full tariV travellers would gain by
buying a reduced fare card. In the case of reduced fare travellers it still
appears that about 23 per cent of the travellers travel too little to make the
purchase of the reduced fare card a good investment. Note that travellers
who are categorised as ‘‘ine cient’’ at this point are precisely those
Table 1
Budgetary e ciency of travellers (%)
e cient ine cient total
full tariV 31.9 26.6 58.5
reduced tariV 31.9 9.6 41.5
total 63.8 36.2 100.0
7Note that in the model of Section 2 this inequality is equivalent with (4).
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travellers who locate themselves at a suboptimal part of the budget set,
that is, the inner line DBE. A more detailed picture of the distribution of
the net bene®ts is given in Figures 3 and 4. These ®gures depict an absolute
measure of e ciency, which is de®ned as the diVerence between the cost of
the ticket type that is not chosen and the cost of the chosen ticket type.
(For reduction card holders this bene®t equals cf…k† ¡ cr…k†.) On average,
one is indiVerent between the two types of tickets at a yearly consumption
of 1240 train kilometres. The many negative values in Figure 3, some with
considerable magnitude, as compared to the few negative values in Figure
4, all with low magnitude, suggest that many individuals are reluctant to
buy a reduced fare ticket. Note that both the maximum bene®t of a full
tariV traveller and the maximum loss of a reduced tariV traveller equal the
price of a reduced fare card, which can be clearly seen in both histograms.
The price of a reduced fare card equalled D¯ 9 per month (D¯ 108 per
year) in 1992 and D¯ 8.25 per month (D¯ 99 per year) in 1993.
It should be noted that the current ®ndings bear much resemblance to
Mo tt (1983)’s ascertained disutility from participation in a welfare
programme, and the ®nding of Koning and Ridder (1997) that there is an
‘‘entry fee eVect’’ for households that might apply for rent assistance. For
the current case, several explanations are possible for the discrepancy
between what is observed and what might have been expected on grounds
of a basic microeconomic speci®cation. The most important explanation is
probably that travellers have to make their choice of ticket type in
advance, which means that the decision involves a certain risk. In prin-
Figure 3
Monthly net bene®ts of full tariV travellers, compared to the ‘‘reduced tariV’’ option
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ciple, one buys a reduced fare card for the period of one year, so the
person who invests D¯ 108 to buy a reduced fare card takes a risk because
he is not certain about his future travel behaviour. This theory is in line
with the ®ndings of Train, Ben-Akiva and Atherton (1989), who ®nd that
consumers who are able to ‘‘self-select’’ among diVerent telephone tariVs
‘‘do not choose tariVs with complete knowledge of their demand, but
rather choose tariVs at least partly on the insurance provided by the tariV
in the face of uncertain consumption patterns.’’ Other possible explana-
tions are that travellers are not well informed about the diVerent types of
travel cards, and that there exist some application costs for the purchase of
a reduction card. As examples of the latter, one may think of waiting time
at the ticket-window, and time and eVort to make a photo Ð which is
required in the Netherlands Ð and to ®ll in an application form.
Econometric Speci®cation
Inclusion of take-up cost for reduction cards
The previous section has shown that many travellers experience a certain
threshold before they buy a reduced fare card. Indeed there are also some
reduced tariV travellers who appear to be on the wrong side of their budget
Figure 4
Monthly net bene®ts of reduced tariV travellers, compared to the ‘‘full tariV’’ option
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constraint, but these are easily outnumbered by the ‘‘ine cient’’ full tariV
travellers. In order to take this into account in the economic model of Section
2, a ®xed take-up cost T can be incorporated into the decision process that
has been described in (3) and (4). The latter equation then modi®es into:
v…hpf; Y ¡ pr ¡ T † > v…pf; Y† ,
pr ‡ T < gY: …7†
The expression for g remains unaltered, as in (5). It is seen that if T > 0,
which is expected on the grounds of Section 3, the customer is more
reluctant to buy a reduced fare card than would have been expected on
grounds of the theory in Section 2. In Figure 5 the implications for the
microeconomic model are shown: with the introduction of a take-up cost
DD’, the budget constraint changes to AB’C’, the conditional demand for
the reduced fare ticket changes to x¤2’, and the indiVerence curve through
this conditional demand is drawn by the line u ˆ v2’. Clearly, this ®gure
shows that the take-up cost of a reduced fare card can make this card less
attractive than the option of full tariV tickets. Whereas the original con-
ditional demand x¤2 was superior to the conditional demand for the full
tariV option, the existence of take-up costs means that the full tariV option
is superior to the purchase of a reduction card in this example. Thus the
optimal demand now equals x¤1, due to its superiority over the conditional
demand with a reduced fare card x¤2’. Figure 5 shows that individuals who
locate at BB’ now locate on their budget frontier, which implies that they
are behaving perfectly e ciently. The other side of the coin is that the
consumers in the segment BF, who are e cient with zero take-up costs,
are shifted to the segment GB’ in the case of positive take-up costs,
implying that they are no longer e cient. A comparison of Figures 3 and 4
suggests that the number of travellers on BF is smaller than on BB’, so
that the introduction of positive take-up costs leads to a larger number of
e cient travellers.
Finally note that this new feature of the model does not impose any
new restrictions. If the original model without take-up costs is valid, this
will simply follow from the estimations by not being able to reject the null
hypothesis that ‘‘take-up cost equals zero’’. If this null hypothesis is
rejected, however, there will be proof that there is a take-up cost involved
for people who consider buying a reduced fare card.
Individual tastes
In the model that has been described in the second section it was assumed that
the parameters a, b and d are ®xed. It is likely, however, that diVerent
individuals will have diVerent tastes, and therefore diVerent parameter values.
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In general two ways exist to allow for such variation in taste: ®rst, one can
make one or more of the parameters depend on individual characteristics
that are likely to in¯uence the individuals’ taste; second, one may specify a
stochastic distribution for one or more of the parameters in order to
account for unobserved taste variation. This latter extension is discussed in
the next subsection. In this paper it is assumed that nonstochastic pre-
ference heterogeneity can be captured in the constant term di for individual
i as follows:
di ˆ S 0id …8†
where Si is a vector with individual characteristics. As possible elements of
Si one may think of age, car possession, and other factors of interest. Note
that, to allow for a constant term that is not individual-speci®c, the ®rst
element of Si equals 1 for all individuals.
Stochastic speci®cation
The crucial step in going from a theoretical economic model towards an
empirical model is the stochastic speci®cation. Hausman (1985) gives an
excellent overview of the various sources of randomness in simultaneous
discrete/continuous choice models and suggests various speci®cations to
incorporate these sources into an econometric model. The two most
Figure 5
Positive take-up cost implies reluctance to buy a reduced fare card
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interesting phenomena that are to be modelled as stochastic error terms
are preference heterogeneity and optimisation error. As previously men-
tioned, apart from observed characteristics that may have in¯uence on
one’s taste, it is likely that there is some unobserved heterogeneity in the
preferences of travellers. The general way to specify an error term that
takes account of this is to let one parameter vary according to a stochastic
speci®cation. The parameters of this stochastic speci®cation are then to be
estimated alongside the other parameters of the model. Optimisation error
occurs because consumers do not always have the opportunity to purchase
the desired amount of train kilometres. For example, someone may fall ill,
which means that he is not able to buy his optimal consumption package.
An additional source of optimisation error is caused by the fact that
travellers are able to choose their own type of train ticket. As has already
been argued, this can be partly modelled with an additional (deterministic)
constant, which is a part of what was termed ‘‘take-up cost’’ above. On the
other hand it is likely that there are some unobserved factors that may
cause someone to choose an ‘‘ine cient’’ combination of ticket type and
train kilometres. These can then be modelled by a stochastic error term.
Third there is speci®cation error, which is caused by the modeller’s
inability to specify a perfect econometric model. The usual way to incor-
porate such an error term is by introducing an additive error term in the
demand function. This error term does however not appear in the indirect
utility function, as its mere existence is caused by the modeller and the
traveller does not have anything to do with it while making his optimal
choice of a ticket type. The last form of randomness that is mentioned by
Hausman is measurement error, which is caused by bad measurement of
the data. In the present context, the translation from yearly data to
monthly data constitutes an important part of this measurement error.
Travel data are on a monthly basis, while the decision to purchase a
reduction card or not is in principle taken on a yearly basis. The general
problem of measurement error is, however, a whole issue in itself in the
econometric literature, and will therefore not be considered in detail in this
paper. A useful summary can be found in Greene (1993).
One can imagine that with all these sources of stochasticity it is possible
to construct a wide variety of econometric speci®cations that go together
with (1). In this paper the following two-error model will be estimated:








p1‡bed‡n; n ¹ N 0; t2
¡ ¢
: …9b†
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In this speci®cation the two error terms e and n are assumed to be inde-
pendently distributed. Speci®cation error is taken account of by the sto-
chastic term e, while the error term n is characterised by the above
described optimisation error. The current stochastic speci®cation does not
include a separate error term to incorporate stochastic preference het-
erogeneity, but this is a choice one has to make as it would not be possible
to identify a third additional error term.
Having introduced stochastic terms into the model in (9), one is now
able to derive the likelihood of each observation …k; r†, where k denotes the
number of kilometres and r equals 1 if the individual owns a reduced fare
card and 0 otherwise. As has been shown in (4) an individual chooses the
reduced fare card option if (and only if) the indirect utility function for this
option is higher than for the alternative; that is, travelling at the full rate.
Substituting (9b) in (4) now yields
d ‡ n > G; …10†
where the function G ² G…Y; pr; h; pf† is given in Appendix A. The pre-
sence of the error term n allows one to write the probability that the
individual owns a reduced fare card as
Pr r ˆ 1f g ˆ Pr d ‡ n > Gf g ˆ 1 ¡ Pr n < G ¡ df g




and hence Pr r ˆ 0f g ˆ © G¡dt
¡ ¢
. The likelihood of owning a reduced fare
card and travelling k kilometres can now be written as
`…k; r ˆ 1† ˆ f …kjr ˆ 1† ¢ Pr r ˆ 1f g;
where the density function f is given by













This density function f …kjr ˆ 1† gives the probability density for travelling
k kilometres, given that one owns a reduced fare card. Similarly, the
likelihood of travelling k kilometres with full tariV tickets is expressed in
terms of the conditional density function of travelling k kilometres and the
probability of not owning a reduced fare pass:
`…k; r ˆ 0† ˆ f …kjr ˆ 0† ¢ Pr r ˆ 0f g;
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where
f …kjr ˆ 0† ˆ 1
s
f









ln `i…k; r ˆ 0† ‡
X
i:rˆ1
ln `i…k; r ˆ 1†:
This function is to be maximised to give the maximum likelihood estimates
of the model in (9). Results will be reported in the next section.
Estimation
Design
The estimations focus on persons who had to make a choice between
diVerent types of tickets. This means that groups that receive free travel
cards have been excluded. In the Netherlands this mainly concerns stu-
dents, people from the army, and railway personnel (around 12 per cent of
the sample). Only Second Class passengers (about 90 per cent of the
sample) have been selected in the ®nal data set.
The ®xed cost of a reduced fare card ( pr) equalled D¯ 9 in 1992 and D¯
8.25 in 1993 (on a monthly basis). In the estimations the full tariV kilo-
metre price has been ®xed at the sample average kilometre price of D¯
0.22. In the Netherlands, the level of the marginal tariV per kilometre
depends on the length of a trip. It starts with a rather high value of around
D¯ 0.30 for short trips and slightly decreases to around D¯ 0.10 for longer
trips. For very long trips, the marginal price can even equal zero. In
general, one would be able to make use of two diVerent values for the price
of a train kilometre: First, the average individual kilometre price ( ·pi) may
be used in the microeconomic model, and second, the average kilometre
price of the whole population ( ·p) can be used. Thus, the ®rst method
allows for individually diVerentiated prices, while the second makes use of
a ‘‘uniform’’ price. An advantage of the ®rst method is that this ‘‘mea-
surement’’ of price will be more precise at the individual level. However, it
should be noted that ·pi is in general not equal to the marginal price of a
train kilometre, which is of course the price that one is interested in.8 In
8To see this, consider the nonlinear budget constraint p…k† ‡ H ˆ y, with the diVerentiable
kilometre expense function p…¢†. The Lagrange function equals L ˆ u…k; H †¡
l p…k† ‡ H ¡ y… †, and hence the ®rst order condition for utility maximisation is:
uk=uH ˆ p 0…k†. Thus, it is this marginal price p 0…k† that we are interested in, and not
the average price p…k†=k.
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that respect it remains uncertain, a priori, which method is better. The
main reason that in this paper ·p has been used instead of ·pi, is that the
latter method constitutes a potential source for endogeneity bias. In this
sense, ·p seems to be the best available instrument for the marginal price of
each individual, as (a) it safeguards the estimates from endogeneity bias,
while ·pi does not, and (b) it is not necessarily less precise than the ·pi
method because both methods involve average prices, and eventually it is
the marginal price that one is interested in.
As the original data set did not contain information on the respon-
dents’ income, their income has been replaced by a proxy variable which
has been constructed according to the model in Appendix B. Although this
inclusion of ‘‘predicted income’’ into the model may bring about some
measurement error, it is to be preferred over negligence of this essential
explanatory variable.9 Note that under the assumption of independence
between the error term of the income regression in Appendix B and the
error term in the demand equation (9a), this procedure is essentially
equivalent to the use of instrumental variables.
The vector Si in (8), which allows for taste heterogeneity of individuals,
contains variables on age, car availability, household size, and a dummy
that indicates whether the individual is a housewife or not. The exact
expression for d is as follows:
d ˆ d0 ‡ d1AGE1 ‡ d2AGE2 ‡ d3CAR1 ‡ d4CAR2 ‡ d5HHSIZE ‡ d6HWIFE:
In this speci®cation ‘‘AGE1’’ and ‘‘AGE2’’ are dummies indicating whe-
ther the individual is younger than 30 years of age, or at least 50 years of
age, respectively. The dummy variables ‘‘CAR1’’ and ‘‘CAR2’’ signify
‘‘can always make use of a car’’ and ‘‘can often make use of a car’’
respectively.
Results
Table 2 contains the results of the maximum likelihood estimation pro-
cedure that has been outlined in Section 4. Apart from the dummy vari-
able for housewives, all parameter estimates turn out to be signi®cant at a
5 per cent con®dence level. Moreover, all the estimates have the sign that is
consistent with prior expectations and with microeconomic theory. The
results indicate that the demand for train kilometres is fairly inelastic with
respect to income. With values of ¡1:24 and ¡1:37 the demand for train
kilometres turns out to be price elastic. The model with take-up costs turns
out to be superior to the model without these costs, as can be read from
9See Greene (1993).
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the likelihood scores and the low standard error of the take-up cost
parameter. Moreover, the number of ine cient travellers (in the sense of
(6)) decreased by 7.3 per cent with the introduction of this threshold
parameter.
It can be seen from the table that the estimate of the price elasticity in
the model without take-up costs is lower (in an absolute sense) than the
price elasticity in the model with take-up costs. Thus negligence of the
take-up cost eVect leads to under-estimation of the price sensitivity of
travellers. In other words, in the model without take-up costs the perceived
reluctance of travellers to buy a reduced fare card is solely explained from
their relative insensitivity for price diVerences, which clearly leads to
under-estimation of the price elasticity. The model with take-up cost
explains the reluctance to buy a reduced fare card not only from relative
price insensitivity, but also from other factors mentioned earlier. Hence
the ®rst conclusion is that, given the high signi®cance of the take-up
parameter, reluctance to buy a reduced fare card need not only be
attributed to the relative price insensitivity of a group of individuals.
Motives such as risk aversion and inadequate information induce a
threshold eVect that is independent of ‘‘marginal price eVects’’. Comparing
the absolute value of this threshold eVect, D¯ 36.73 on a yearly basis,10
with the price of a reduction card, D¯ 108 in 1992, and D¯ 99 in 1993, it
Table 2




Parameters Estimates Std.err. Estimates Std.err.
d: constant 1.6619 0.2221 1.8981 0.1751
age <30 ¡0:0879 0:0216 ¡0:0743 0:0166
age ¶ 50 0.1630 0.0231 0.1252 0.0179
car available (always) ¡0:2170 0.0216 ¡0:1675 0.0171
car available (often) ¡0:0993 0.0272 ¡0:0808 0.0208
household size ¡0:0766 0.0077 ¡0:0600 0.0062
housewife ¡0:0343 0.0230 ¡0:0183 0.0173
ln income 0.1445 0.0285 0.0988 0.0211
ln price ¡1:2386 0.0501 ¡1:3732 0.0514
take-up cost Ð Ð 3.0606 0.1790
10 Results in Table 2 are on a monthly basis.
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can be seen that the average take-up cost equals 35 per cent of the actual
price of a reduction card. The second conclusion is that the estimate for
the price elasticity equals ¡1:37 and thus that the oV-peak demand for
train kilometres is quite sensitive with regard to price.
The estimation implies that people who are younger than 30 years of
age …¡7:2 per cent), people with high …¡15:4 per cent) or medium …¡7:8
per cent) car availability, and housewives …¡1:8 per cent) have less demand
for train kilometres than others. On the other hand, people who are older
than 50 years of age on average demand 13.3 per cent more train kilo-
metres than others. The negative eVect of the household size variable is
most probably due to the fact that families with children prefer to travel by
car, as the additional costs are zero in this case.
As mentioned at the end of Section 2, the reported estimates should
satisfy the Slutsky condition in order to constitute a valid microeconomic
model. Fortunately, the restriction was satis®ed for all respondents for all
diVerent estimations.
Interpretation of the estimated price elasticity
As shown in Section 3, the current study is based on a cross-section data
set. This means that exactly one observation is available for each indivi-
dual who has participated in the underlying survey. The static nature of
this data set implies that the current microeconometric analysis aims to
describe an equilibrium status, and thus that the reported price elasticities
should be interpreted as long-run estimates of the average price sensitivity
of travellers by train. It is likely that short-run eVects of price changes are
smaller in magnitude, in particular because reduced fare card holders have
committed themselves to a certain way of travelling during a given period.
In other words, substitution eVects for reduction card holders will often be
‘‘lagged’’ until the expiration date of the reduction card.
In the past, several attempts have been made to estimate price elasti-
cities for the demand for transport by train. Oum, Waters II and Yong
(1992) give an overview of price elasticities for various means of transport,
mainly based on studies from the 1980s. There appears to be some dis-
persion between estimates, but this can mainly be attributed to the type of
data that has been used (cross-section, panel, aggregate time-series) as well
as to the market segment (business, leisure) for which the elasticity has
been estimated. As mentioned by Oum (1989) comparison of diVerent
estimates is often di cult, especially when the models to be compared are
not nested in a more general model. Nevertheless, if the data source and
the model assumptions are well taken into account, comparison of dif-
ferent elasticity estimates can be fruitful. Based on an aggregate time-series
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data set, Oum (1992) reports a price elasticity of ¡1:16 for the Netherlands
(1990). This study, however, does not distinguish between peak and oV-
peak hour demand, nor between First and Second Class travellers. Given
the widely adopted notion that peak hour demand is less elastic than the
oV-peak demand for train kilometres, the oV-peak price elasticity of ¡1:37
that has been estimated in this paper perfectly ®ts this ®gure.
Welfare implications of a positive take-up cost
Clearly, this study shows that the purchase of a reduced fare card involves
a large take-up cost. We brie¯y discuss the welfare implications of this.
As far as lack of information is the cause of the existence of take-up
costs, there may be room for a Pareto improvement by providing better
information to travellers. In any case this will make all travellers at least as
well oV as they were. Better information means that individuals have a
better perception of their budget constraints, which de facto implies a rise
in income. In Figure 5 this translates into a rise of the segment B’C’, and
thus will always yield at least as good a consumption package as the
traveller already had. For the railway company, the eVect of such an
information measure is ambiguous. Better information not only aVects
people who were already locating at their budget constraint, but may also
induce ‘‘irrational’’ travellers to improve their utility by moving towards a
consumption package for which their budget constraint is binding. For
instance, the railway company can often make an extra pro®t out of
people who travel at full tariV while they would have been better oV if they
travelled at the reduced tariV (that is, users on B’E in Figure 5). Better
information will surely make the number of these unwise travellers fall.
The conclusion is that there exist both negative and positive eVects on the
pro®ts of the railway company, and that the overall eVect remains unclear
a priori. Thus the overall welfare eVect remains undetermined, and will in
general depend on the extent to which better information is provided. The
inability to foresee one’s future behaviour has essentially the same welfare
implications as the information factor. The only diVerence is that one’s
ability to foresee future behaviour cannot easily be improved, and thus the
practical realisation of a possible welfare improvement is di cult for this
case.
Second, the existence of take-up costs is an important factor in the
eventual design of a modi®ed tariV structure. Whereas standard welfare
analysis provides clear-cut results on how to increase total welfare, or even
on how to obtain a Pareto-improvement (see Brown and Sibley (1986)),
the present case does not Ð in general Ð allow for an application of these
results. This implies that each proposed modi®cation of the tariV structure
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has to be carefully examined, thereby taking into account the take-up costs
that are involved. See Train et al. (1989) for a more elaborate discussion.
Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper a model for the demand for train kilometres has been pro-
posed and estimated. The approach that was used has been utilised pre-
viously in other areas of interest, such as labour supply and electricity
demand, but has hardly received attention in the area of travel demand. As
there appear to be many people who demand a combination of ticket type
and train kilometres that is not optimal, this study has paid special atten-
tion to this issue by introducing a ‘‘take-up cost’’ parameter into the model.
The current estimates show that the price elasticity equals ¡1:37 and
that the income elasticity is fairly small at about 0.1. Inclusion of a take-up
cost in the model clearly shows that on average individuals are more
reluctant to buy a reduced fare pass than would otherwise have been
expected. To be precise, the average take-up cost equals D¯ 36.72 on a
yearly basis, which equals 35 per cent of the price of a reduction card. There
are several possible explanations for this large take-up cost. First, people
who want to buy a reduction card have to take action to purchase it. Such
action may include waiting time, ®lling in forms, and so on. Another
possibility is that people are not well aware of their opportunities. In other
words, they lack information about the diVerent types of train tickets. A
®nal explanation is that people who consider buying a reduction card have
to make the decision in advance. People who are uncertain about their
future travel behaviour may therefore choose to ‘‘wait and see’’ instead of
taking the pre-emptive action of buying a reduced fare card.
To conclude this paper some possible extensions of the model are
mentioned, which may be used in future analyses. First, as mentioned
above, it is possible to construct a wide variety of econometric speci®ca-
tions that have the economic model of Section 2 as a baseline.
One of the most interesting extensions would be to specify the price
elasticity as a random variable. Such a random coe cient speci®cation,
which has been used by Burtless and Hausman (1978) among others,
would be of particular interest because the optimal pricing policy of a
natural monopolist typically hinges on the fact that consumers have dif-
ferent price elasticities. (See Varian (1989), in particular the section on
‘‘Second-degree price discrimination’’, for an excellent account.) Identi®-
cation of the spread of price elasticities would then allow for constructing
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the optimal tariV design, which is of course very interesting for both the
railway company and the government.
Second, as it is likely that there is individual variation in take-up costs,
an appealing extension of the current model would be to let the take-up
cost parameter vary with each individual. This variation can be achieved
through the inclusion of individual-speci®c parameters in the take-up cost
speci®cation, analogous to the speci®cation in (8), or by making the take-
up cost parameter stochastic, or even both.
Finally, an interesting extension of this study would be to let the cur-
rent demand model be part of a larger demand system. Such a model
could, for example, include the demand for train kilometres during peak
hours. An interesting feature of such more integrated models would be the
determination of substitution eVects with other types of demands. Sub-
stitution eVects may exist between First Class/Second Class demand, the
afore mentioned peak/oV-peak hour demand, and possibly also between
other means of transport. The inclusion of zero-observations is also an
interesting extension, as the behaviour of non-travellers may be quite
relevant for both policy makers and the Netherlands Railways (NS).
Appendix A Ticket Choice
In this appendix we give a functional form for G, such that the equivalence
in (10) holds for all parameter values and all price and income levels:
G…Y; pr; h; pf† :ˆ …1 ¡ a† ln Y ¡ …1 ‡ b† ln pf ¡ ln j1 ¡ aj ‡ ln j1 ‡ bj‡





­­­­­¡ ln 1 ¡ h
1‡b
­­ ­­:
This equation is derived by rearranging (4), taking logs and rearranging
once more. The absolute signs appear in order to allow for possibly
income- and/or price-elastic demand, that is, a > 1 and/or b < ¡1
respectively.
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Appendix B The Income Equation
Making use of the ‘‘OSA-arbeidsaanbodpanel 1985±88’’ the following
income equation has been estimated:
ln INCOME ˆ 5:72 ‡ 0:542 ln EDU ‡ 0:231 ln AGE ¡ 0:633I FEMf g
…0:172† …0:0401† …0:0399† …0:0256†
R2 ˆ 0:325
In this model the logarithm of income has been speci®ed as a linear
function of (the logarithmic transformations of) education (‘EDU’), age
(‘AGE’) and gender (‘FEM’). This last variable equals 1 if the individual is
a female, and 0 otherwise. Income is de®ned as the net personal monthly
income. Standard errors are denoted in parentheses below the corre-
sponding estimates. All parameters turn out to be highly signi®cant at the
5 per cent and 1 per cent level. It is seen that ‘‘gender’’ explains a large
share of the variation in individual income: on average the model predicts
that women earn 47 per cent less than men. Of course ‘‘discrimination’’ is
not the only explanation for this gap, as in the Netherlands labour par-
ticipation of women is lower and many women who do work have part
time jobs. More sophisticated speci®cations have not been taken into
consideration since an important side constraint is that the explanatory
variables to be included have to be present in both the OSA and the NS
data sets.
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